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DEPORTATION OF AN ALIEN FOR A MARIJUANA
CONVICTION CAN CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: Lieggi v. United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 389 F. Supp.
12 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
INTRODUCTION
In Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice,1 the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held deportation of an alien convicted of selling marijuana to be
cruel and unusual punishment.
Andrea Lieggi had immigrated to the United States from Italy
and had several years later been convicted under California law2
of selling three marijuana cigarettes to his former roommate. On
the basis of this conviction the Immigration and Naturalization
Service found him deportable.3 In his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, Lieggi argued that his deportation would constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Responding to this contention, the court
stated:
At the outset it must be noted that there is no precedent for
applying cruel and unusual punishment standards to a deportation
case .... Historically, the courts never considered the Eighth
Amendment to be appropriate in deportation cases....
... In. support counsel cited passages from Alexander Solzhen-
itsyn's Gulag Archipelago, but unfortunately no legal authority or
precedent. 4
Nevertheless the court agreed with Lieggi and granted his petition.
NATURE OF DEPORTATION
Deportation is the procedure whereby the Attorney General
1. 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. ILl. 1975).
2. CAL. HEALTH & S. CoDE § 11531 (now id. § 11360, West 1974).
3. An alien is deportable if he has been convicted of any law relating
to possession of, or traffic in, marijuana or narcotic drugs. Immigration
and Nationality Act [hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act], § 241 (a) (11), 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (11) (1970).
4. Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 19-20 (N.D. 1l1. 1975).
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effects the departure from the United States5 of an alien who has
committed an offense rendering him deportable.7 Not all deport-
able offenses are criminal acts; an alien may be deported for be-
havior which is not punishable at all when engaged in by citizens.8
5. The exclusive procedure for determining deportability is a hearing
before a "special inquiry officer" (also called an Immigration Judge), who
is an employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service [hereinafter
referred to as the Service]. The mechanics of the procedure are set forth
in the I. & N. Act, § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970). Once an alien
has been found deportable, the Attorney General (through the Service) has
six months in which to effect the alien's departure from the United States.
Id. § 242(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (c).
6. An alien is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States."
Id. § 101(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (3). It should be noted this definition
thus includes not only persons who entered the United States illegally, but
also aliens admitted as lawful permanent residents or as lawful nonimmi-
grants (e.g., aliens with student visas, tourist visas, etc.).
7. The grounds for deporting an alien from the United States are enu-
merated in the I. & N. Act, § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1970).
8. See, e.g., id. § 241(a) (3), 8 U.S.C § 1251 (a) (3) (deportable if institu-
tionalized at government expense because of mental disease, within five
years after entry, unless the alien can affirmatively show such disease did
not exist prior to entry); id. § 241 (a) (6) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (6) (B)
(deportable for advocating, or for being affiliated with any organization
which advocates, opposition to all organized government); id. § 241 (a) (6)
(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (6) (C) (deportable for joining the Communist
party); id. § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (11) (deportable for being, or
ever having been, a narcotic drug addict, even if rehabilitated).
An alien is also deportable if, at the time of any entry into the United
States, he was subject to some exclusionary provision of the law. Id.
§ 241(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1). The offenses for which an alien can be
excluded from (i.e., denied admittance to) the United States are enumer-
ated in the I. & N. Act § 212 (a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a). See, e.g., id. § 212 (a)
(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1) (excludable if mentally retarded); id. § 212(a)
(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (excludable if insane); id. § 212(a) (3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a) (3) (an alien is excludable if he has ever had a single attack of
insanity); id. § 212 (a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (excludable if afflicted
with a psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or mental defect); id.
§ 212(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (11) (excludable for advocating the prac-
tice of polygamy); id. § 212(a) (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (15) (excludable if
likely to become a public charge); id. § 212(a) (25), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (25)
(excludable if unable to read and understand some language). Thus an
alien, long resident in the United States, may be deported if he leaves the
country temporarily, and returns while falling into one of the above ex-
clusionary provisions. For limitations on the extent to which deportation
can be predicated on an entry following a temporary absence, see Rosenberg
v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
Finally, it should be noted several of the above offenses are not acts at
all, but rather physical or mental conditions, or sometimes mere beliefs.
The power of the United States to deport aliens has historically
rested on principles of sovereignty. The leading case applying the
sovereignty theory is Fong Yue Ting v. United States,9 where the
Supreme Court reasoned if a nation has inherent power to exclude
(i.e., deny admittance to) aliens, then it also has power to admit
aliens conditionally. Thus, deportation is merely a mechanism to
enforce the return to his own country of an alien who has violated
the terms of his admittance. The sovereignty theory, adopted by
a long line of cases,10 has nevertheless been denounced by judges
and commentators as indefinite and dangerous," supportive of
mass exile,12 and highly fictional. 8
DEPORTATION Is PUNISHMENT
Prior to Lieggi, the courts had consistently held deportation to
be a civil action, not a criminal punishment.' 4 The Lieggi court,
expressing a view shared by many,' 5 condemned such a notion:
9. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
10. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Shaughnessy v.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugajewitz
v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909)
(dictum); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904);
Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(the Chinese exclusion case). A full discussion of the sovereignty theory
is beyond the scope of this paper.
11. Justice Brewer has said:
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indef-
inite and dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be
found, and by whom are they to be pronounced? Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
Substantially agreeing with Justice Brewer's dissent were Justices Fuller
and Field, also dissenting.
12. One commentator, in an excellent discussion of aliens' constitutional
rights, pointed out that the sovereignty theory logically permits, without
hearing, mass exile of aliens long resident in the United States. Note, Im-
migrants, Aliens, and the Constitution, 49 NoTRE DAmr LAw. 1075, 1094
(1974).
13. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958) (Warren, C.J.).
14. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Mahler
v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149 (1923); Cortez v. INS, 395 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1968).
15. E.g., Justice Brewer has said:
But it needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition
that deportation is punishment. Everyone knows that to be forc-
ibly taken away from home and family and friends and business
and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is pun-
ishment, and that often times most severe and cruel. Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (dissent).
James Madison, reporting on the Virginia resolutions pertaining to a pro-
posed alien statute, stated:
[I]f a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among
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How can deportation of an alien legally residing in the United
States be considered anything but punishment? In this case peti-
tioner stands to lose his residence, livelihood, and most impor-
tantly, his family. Certainly if the same thing occurred to a
United States citizen, a court would not hesitate to call it punish-
ment-moreover, cruel and unusual punishment.16
The above reasoning, concentrating on the consequences of de-
portation, is subject to the criticism that something does not con-
stitute punishment merely because its consequences happen to be
severe. Such a criticism must be examined in light of the judicial,
sociological, and historical views of punishment.
Punishment has been judicially defined so as to include pain or
any other penalty inflicted on a person for a crime or offense, by
an authority to which the offender is subject.17 A proceeding
need not be commenced by indictment or information to give rise
to "punishment."' 8 A punishment need not be retributive; it may
be rehabilitative, deterrent, or preventive. 9
One author has defined punishment as "such suffering as is
inflicted upon the offender in a definite way by, or in the name of,
the society of which he is a permanent or temporary member. ' 20
Another author has set forth four elements of punishment: the
state must inflict the punishment in its own name for the viola-
tion of a code; it must administer some sort of suffering (which
the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom
to which the name can be applied. Madison, Report on the Virginia
Resolutions, 4 ELIr'OT'S DEBATES 546, 555 (1800) (debates in state
conventions concerning adoption of the United States Constitution
and statutes pursuant thereto).
Many modern jurists have expressed similar feelings. Thus Justice
Frankfurter acknowledged that "the intrinsic consequences of deportation
are so close to punishment for crime. . . ." Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
531 (1954). Justice Brandeis noted deportation "may result also in loss of
both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living." Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Judge Learned Hand stated flatly,
"nothing can be more disingenuous than to say that deportation in these
circumstances is not punishment." Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878,
879 (2d Cir. 1947).
16. 389 F. Supp. at 17.
17. Fowler v. American Mail Line, 69 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1934); Washing-
ton v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 601, 109 So. 588 (1926); McIntyre v. Commonwealth,
154 Ky. 149, 156 S.W. 1058 (1913).
18. McHugh v. Placid Oil Co., 206 La. 511, -- -, 19 So. 2d 221, 225, 227
(1944).
19. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
20. 1 E. WESTERmARcK, THE ORIGIN AND DEVE~oPmEa OF THE MORAL
IDEAS 169 (1906).
may include mental anguish or the loss of social status); the pun-
ishment must be intended, not accidental, and it must be a form
of disapproval.21
Deportation falls squarely within these definitions. That it en-
tails suffering is amply demonstrated by the above-quoted passage
from Lieggi; deportation is inflicted by, and in the name of, the
United States for violation of the immigration laws; the removal
is intentional, not fortuitous, and there can be no doubt it is a
form of disapproval. Thus, deportation satisfies all the elements
of punishment.
Historically, exile and banishment were common forms of pun-
ishment.22  Penal sanctions in 17th century France included
banishment (for life) and exile (which did not connote the same
degree of infamy as banishment) .23 The transportation of crim-
inal offenders to penal colonies was a practice arising among those
European nations which had acquired distant colonies.24 England
first began transporting criminals to its American colonies in
1718; after the American Revolution, English convicts were trans-
ported to Australia and adjacent islands.2r Banishment and exile
reached their peak as forms of punishment in Czarist Russia.20
The historical practice of removing criminal offenders from society
supports views proclaiming such removal to be punishment. 27
The notion that deportation is not punishment is thus incom-
patible with the judicial, sociological and historical views of pun-
ishment, as well as with common sense. Given the obviously
enormous disruptive effect of deportation on the lives of entire
families,2 s this area of the law is one in which dependence on legal
fictions is uniquely inappropriate.
21. W. RECKLESS, TuE CRIME PROBLEM (4th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as RECKLESs]. The disapproval aspect was emphasized in S. SCHAFER, THEO-
RIES IN CanimvoioYy 299 (1969).
22. RECKLESS 497, n.25.
23. C. voN BAR, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL LAw 269-77 (1916).
24. RECKESs 497-98. See also Barnes, Transportation of Criminal7s, 15
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90-93 (1935).
25. IL MAYHEw & J. BINNY, THE CRIMINAL PRISONS OF LONDON AND
SCENES OF PRISON Luz 92-93 (1862).
26. RECKLESS 498.
27. E.g., deportation has been explicitly characterized as a punitive meas-
ure. See id. Removal of an individual from a group has been described
as a typical form of punishment; such removal includes not only execution
and confinement, but also banishment and transportation. E. SUTHERLAND,
CRnVIINOLOGY 317 (1924).
28. See text accompanying note 16 supra. The court later acknowledged
Lieggi's argument that deportation not only punishes the alien, but also de-
stroys his American family. Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 19 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
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Deportation for a Marijuana Conviction Is Cruel
and Unusual Punishment
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
Having concluded deportation is a form of punishment, the court
in Lieggi was faced with the issue of what causes a particular pun-
ishment to be regarded as cruel and unusual. Though the Supreme
Court acknowledged it has not defined the exact scope of the phrase
"cruel and unusual, ' 29 certain principles have evolved.
In Furman v. Georgia,30 Justice Brennan wrote a concurring
opinion analyzing the problem in depth. He set forth several guid-
ing principles, one of which was that a punishment cannot be exces-
sive.31 A punishment is excessive if it serves no penal purpose
more effectively than a lesser punishment (i.e., the severe punish-
ment is unnecessary) or by its length or severity it is greatly dis-
proportionate to the offense.32 Some courts have considered addi-
29. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
30. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In a 5-4 decision the Court held the imposition
and execution of the death penalty on three black defendants who had been
charged with murder (in one case) and rape (in the other two cases) would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Each of the nine justices wrote
a separate opinion. Justices Douglas and Stewart emphasized the selective
application of the death penalty to minorities. Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall stressed the excessive and unnecessary nature of the death
penalty; Justice Marshall believed it was morally unacceptable to the
American people. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist dissented, arguing the eighth amendment does not
bar all punishments which the state is unable to prove necessary to control
crime, and does not concern itself with the procedure by which a state
arrives at a particular punishment in a particular case.
31. Id. at 280.
32. Id. Justices White and Marshall also indicated the punishment can-
not be excessive. Justice White noted that the infrequent imposition of a
penalty may prevent it from accomplishing the aims of retribution and
deterrence. Justice Marshall detailed the history of the proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment in Anglo-American law. Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903); O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323 (1892) (Field & Harlan, JJ., dissenting) (majority did not
reach issue of cruel and unusual punishment); Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp.
12 (N.D. Ill. 1975); People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1975); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
tional factors: the nature of the offense and the offender, with
particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; a
comparison of the challenged penalty to penalties in the same ju-
risdiction for more serious crimes; and a comparison of the chal-
lenged penalty to that for the same offense in other jurisdictions.83
A second principle discussed by Justice Brennan is that a pun-
ishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human digni-
ty.34 In particular, a severe punishment arbitrarily inflicted will
be regarded as one not comporting with human dignity.85
A third guiding principle is that the standards for judging
whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual change as
society's values become more enlightened and more humane. 80
Thus a penalty permissible at one time is not necessarily permissi-
ble today.37
A corollary to the above principles is that the determination of
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual must be made in light
of the seriousness of the offense for which punishment has been
prescribed. Therefore, it is essential to consider the nature of a
marijuana conviction. The following discussion will demonstrate
that all three of the foregoing principles lead to the same conclu-
sion; deportation of an alien for a marijuana conviction is cruel
and unusual punishment.
In almost every area but immigration law, the modern trend
has been to reduce the penalties for conviction of marijuana vio-
lations. The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, 8
33. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); People v. Wingo, 14 Cal.
3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910,
519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503
P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
34. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
35. Id. at 274.
This conclusion stems from the thesis that "the State does not respect
human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe
punishment that it does not inflict upon others." Id.
36. Id. at 242; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Lieggi
v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
37. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
38. The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse was estab-
lished by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 601, 84 Stat. 1236, 1280. By statute, the Commis-
sion consisted of two members of the Senate, two members of the House,
and nine persons appointed by the President (Mr. Nixon). Id. It should
be noted a majority of the members, before joining the Commission, had
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after intensive study,39 concluded that marijuana use produces no
significant defects, injury to brain tissue or other organs, or sig-
nificant physical, biochemical, or mental irregularities; that even
the long-term consumption of cannabis in moderate doses has no
harmful effects; that marijuana use is not addictive; and that pos-
session of marijuana for personal use should no longer be a crim-
inal offense.40
A number of states have all but eliminated serious penalties for
marijuana violations.41 These changes signal a clear national trend
toward recognizing the relatively harmless nature of marijuana.
Such a trend, together with the Commission recommendations dis-
cussed above, destroys any justification for severe penalties.
Is deportation disproportionate to a marijuana offense? Com-
pare the harshness of the penalty to the gravity of the offense.
opposed the decriminalization of marijuana. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
Feb. 21, 1972, at 75.
39. The first Commission Report contained a two-volume Appendix of
Technical Papers, consisting of the results of various studies performed
either before the formation of, or at the direction of, the Commission. See
Albrecht, Marijuana Possession and the California Constitutional Prohibi-
tion of Cruel or Unusual Punishment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1136, 1136 n.1
(1974).
40. FIRST REPoRT OF NATONAL Covnnussioi ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG
ABUSE at 154, n.1 (1972), cited in Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 20 (N.D.
Ill. 1975).
41. Possession of up to one ounce of marijuana is punishable by
a maximum fine of $100 in Oregon; incarceration has been elimi-
nated as a sanction. In Massachusetts, probation is mandatory
upon first conviction for possession. West Virginia law provides
that any first possession or distribution offense (less than fifteen
grams) must be conditionally discharged. Likewise, a conviction
as a "disorderly person", a quasi-criminal non-indictable offense, is
the maximum which can be imposed for possession of twenty-five
grams or less in New Jersey. Nebraska imposes a maximum pen-
alty of seven days imprisonment for conviction of possession of up
to one pound of marijuana. Other states provide for minimal im-
prisonment. In addition, at least thirty-two states now have stat-
utes resembling the conditional discharge provisions of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act. These statutes provide for dismissal
without an adjudication of guilt upon completion by the arrestee
of conditions set by the court (footnotes omitted). Albrecht,
supra note 39, at 1160-61.
The California statute enacted on July 9, 1975, also implements a sweep-
ing reform of the state's marijuana laws. The statute reduces the maximum
penalty for possession, transportation, or giving away (of one ounce of other
than "concentrated cannabis" or less) to a $100 fine, and creates compre-
hensive expungement procedures. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 11357(b),
11360 (c), 11361.5 (West Supp. 1976).
Deportation, because of its severity, has traditionally been viewed
with great disfavor by the judiciary.42 As Justice Black observed:
"Petitioner now loses his job, his friends, his home, and maybe
even his children, who must choose between their father and their
native country. '43 Quite often an immigrant has broken all ties
with his former country. To deport such a person is to forbid a
return to his adopted nation.
Against the extreme harshness of the penalty, the gravity of the
offense pales. The victimless nature of the crime, the obvious fre-
quency with which the marijuana laws are broken,44 the lack of
significant physiological or mental damage associated with mari-
juana, and its lack of addictive properties 45 combine to illustrate
the relatively trivial nature of a marijuana violation. The dispro-
portionate character of the deportation penalty is all too apparent.
Deportation is excessive not only because it is disproportionate
to the offense, but also because it is unnecessary. It should be
noted deportation is double punishment; i.e., it is imposed in addi-
tion to the full measure of criminal penalties already applicable.
Since not all potential criminal offenders are aliens, one must as-
sume the existing level of criminal sanctions represents a legisla-
tive judgment that these sanctions are themselves adequate to
achieve desired penal goals. Thus, deportation, when added to a
potential fine or imprisonment already deemed adequate, is unnec-
essary and therefore excessive.
Rapid liberalization in various states' marijuana laws reflect the
modem attitude toward marijuana. Such fundamental changes by
society bolster the argument that in today's time frame, deporting
42. E.g., deportation has been described as a "drastic sanction, one which
can destroy lives and disrupt families," Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374
U.S. 469, 479 (1963); a "savage penalty," Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223,
243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting); a drastic measure and at times "the
equivalent of banishment or exile," Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6,
10 (1948); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947); "as great a
hardship as the deprivation of the right to pursue a vocation or a calling,"
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945); a "drastic sanction," Berdo v.
INS, 432 F.2d 824, 848 (6th Cir. 1970).
Many of the passages cited in notes 15 & 16 supra, which demonstrate
that deportation is punishment, serve also to illustrate the peculiar severity
of such punishment.
43. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
44. Approximately 24,000,000 Americans over eleven years of age have
used marijuana, including one half of all people in the 18-to-25 age group.
FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ComImIssIoN oN MARIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE
at 32 (1972).
45. Id. at 154, n.1, cited in Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 20 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
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an alien for a marijuana conviction is cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Drug laws enacted at a time when public knowledge and
understanding of marijuana were minimal should not serve as a
basis today for effecting a sanction as severe as deportation.
The arbitrary nature of deporting an alien convicted of a mari-
juana violation can be dramatically illustrated by comparing such
an offender to one convicted of premeditated murder. An alien
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is deportable only
if the crime was committed within five years after he entered the
United States.4 6 An alien is also deportable if he is convicted of
possession of marijuana regardless of when the crime was com-
mitted.47 Thus if two aliens, both of whom have resided lawfully
in the United States for at least five years, are subsequently con-
victed of different crimes-alien # 1 of premeditated murder, and
alien # 2 of possession of marijuana-the staggering result of the
46. Even then, such an alien is deportable only if a sentence of at least
one year is imposed. I. & N. Act § 241 (a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1970).
This subsection also prescribes deportation for an alien convicted of two
crimes involving moral turpitude, regardless of timing and regardless of
sentence imposed. Id.
47. Id. § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (11) (covering any law relating
to possession of, or traffic in, marijuana or narcotic drugs). It has been
held a statute proscribing use of marijuana is not one relating to possession
and thus cannot subject an alien to deportation under this section. Varga
v. Rosenberg, 237 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1964); In re Sum, 13 I. & N. Dec.
569 (1970). Nor do statutes proscribing being under the influence of mari-
juana result in deportation. Varga v. Rosenberg, 237 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.
Cal. 1964). The same is true for statutes proscribing knowingly being in
a place where narcotic drugs are used. In re Schunck, 14 I. & N. Dec. -
(I.D. 2137 1972). All these cases have stressed the congressional intent to
deter aliens from committing crimes potentially involving trafficking.
The Second Circuit held on October 7, 1975, that John Lennon, convicted
of possession of marijuana under an English statute not requiring guilty
knowledge, could not be excluded from the United States pursuant to the
I. & N. Act § 212(a) (23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (23) (1970), which renders ex-
cludable any alien convicted of "illicit" possession of marijuana. The court
held the term "illicit" requires a guilty knowledge on the part of the ac-
cused, and thus one cannot be excluded on the basis of a conviction for
possession of marijuana unless the conviction was pursuant to a statute re-
quiring guilty knowledge. The Board of Immigration Appeals, although
differing with the court's construction of the English statute in question,
had agreed that guilty knowledge is required. The Lennon holding should
apply equally to the corresponding deportation provisions, id. § 241 (a) (11).
8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (11), for that provision also requires "illicit" possession.
The Lennon case, not yet reported, is discussed in 44 U.S.L.W. 2169 (2d Cir.
Oct. 21, 1975).
present law is that alien # 2 is deportable while alien # 1 is not.
This result amply illustrates the arbitrary nature of the deporta-
tion laws regarding marijuana.48
THE EFFECT OF Lieggi
Ruling that deportation is punishment" has potentially enormous
ramifications. It is well-settled that an alien undergoing deporta-
tion proceedings is entitled to procedural due process;50 all that re-
mains to be resolved is which rights such due process entails. If
the equal protection clause requires that an alien facing punish-
ment receive the same procedural due process safeguards as a cit-
izen in like circumstances, and if deportation is punishment, then
it follows that an alien at a deportation hearing should be entitled
to the same procedural due process safeguards to which a citizen
would be entitled in criminal proceedings.51 Such safeguards
would presumably include, inter alia, the right to counsel at all
significant stages (at government expense),52 the right to be free
48. Analogous reasoning was employed in Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d
1288 (6th Cir. 1975). In that case, the court, after noting that the Ohio
criminal penalties for sale of marijuana far exceed those for several violent
crimes, declared such marijuana penalties to be cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
49. The ruling that deportation is punishment, being essential to the
court's conclusion that deporting Lieggi would be cruel and unusual punish-
ment, is holding, not dictum.
50. See, e.g., Piccirillo v. INS, 512 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1975); Hirsch v.
INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962); McConney v. Rogers, 287 F.2d 473 (9th
Cir. 1961); Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961); Yiannopoulos
v. Robinson, 247 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1957).
51. The court asserts the following thesis:
This court is of the opinion that application of the equal protec-
tion doctrine to legal resident aliens requires that they not be sub-jected to the penalty of deportation without the application, at a
minimum, of those standards of due process and equal protection
which would be enjoyed in a criminal trial involving a citizen.
Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 19 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
The court later states, however, that the "exact parameters of how far
the Supreme Court will extend constitutional protections to aliens is still
undetermined," id., and that "Lieggi is entitled to at least minimal constitu-
tional rights," id. (emphasis added). These statements would seem to indi-
cate the court is trying to retreat from the far-reaching position that an
alien at a deportation hearing is entitled to the same due process require-
ments as is a citizen in a criminal proceeding, by classifying the position
as dictum. It is suggested the court cannot escape the conclusion that such
a position is holding, for, as the text accompanying this footnote demon-
strates, the position follows logically from the court's holding that deporta-
tion is punishment.
52. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
[VOL. 13: 454, 1976] Recent Developments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
from unreasonable searches and seizures (and an exclusionary
rule with which to effectuate that right),53 a requirement that
every essential fact be proved beyond reasonable doubt,54 the right
to reasonable bail,5 5 the right to jury trial,56 and the right to re-
ceive Miranda warnings.
57
Ruling that deportation of an alien for a marijuana conviction
can be cruel and unusual punishment has an even more direct ef-
fect. Defeating deportation predicated on a marijuana or narcotics
conviction traditionally has been nearly impossible, for many of
the defenses applicable to deportation based on other crimes are
specifically inapplicable to that based on marijuana and narcotics.5 8
Thus, constitutional attack may prove to be the only effective
means of preventing deportation in these areas.
LIMITATIONS ON THE Lie ggi HOLDING
Stopping short of ruling that deportation of an alien for a mari-
juana conviction will always be cruel and unusual punishment,
Judge Bauer noted the "unique facts" and "compelling circum-
53. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
54. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
55. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
56. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
57. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58. For example, four such defenses are:
(a) The judicial recommendation against deportation, a device whereby
the trial judge can prevent deportation predicated on the conviction by rec-
ommending the alien not be deported, is by its own terms inapplicable to
I. & N. Act § 241 (a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (11) (1970), which renders an
alien deportable for a marijuana or narcotics violation. Id. § 241(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1251 (b);
(b) The same is true of the executive pardon. Id.;
(c) A discretionary remedy, suspension of deportation, allows the Attor-
ney General to suspend the deportation of an alien who meets certain con-
ditions, including a continuous residence requirement. Id. § 244 (a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254 (a). For most crimes the requirement is that the alieh reside contin-
uously in the United States for seven years immediately preceding the date
of application for the remedy. Id. § 244(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1). For
marijuana or narcotics, however, the continuous residence requirement is
ten years, and the period does not even begin until the time of violation.
Id. § 244(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (2);
(d) For most crimes, deportation can often be averted by expunging the
conviction; for youth offenders, pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1969), or the California Youth Authority Act, CAL.
WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE § 1772 (West 1971); for adult offenders, pursuant
stances" 59 of the case: Lieggi was the sole financial support of his
family; he had no close relatives, and no independent means of
support outside the United States; he had sold only three mari-
juana cigarettes to his former roommate; he was a lawful perma-
nent resident; he had conducted himself in an exemplary manner
since the conviction; and during his ten years in the United States
he had on no other occasion been "involved with the law."00
Further, given the court's emphasis on the relatively innocuous
nature of a marijuana violation, 1 it must be assumed the holding
does not extend to convictions involving other drugs.62 However,
since Lieggi's conviction was for sale of marijuana, the court's hold-
ing would seem to apply a fortiori to such other marijuana offen-
ses as possession, possession for sale, transportation, giving away,
use, being under the influence, and knowingly being in a place
where marijuana is used.63
Finally, although the procedural device employed by Lieggi was
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, nothing in the court's opin-
ion indicates the holding would not apply equally when the issue
is raised on direct appeal.6 4
to CAL. PEtN CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a (West 1969). Expungement under any
of these statutes eliminates the conviction as a basis for deportation for most
crimes. In re Nagy, 12 I. & N. Dec. 623 (1968); In re Ibarra-Obando, 12
I. & N. Dec. 576 (A.G. 1967). However, adult expungement has been held
not to eliminate a marijuana or narcotics conviction as a basis for deporta-
tion. Brownrigg v. INS, 356 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1966); Kelly v. INS, 349
F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 932 (1965); Garcia-Gonzales v.
INS, 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); In re A-F-,
8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 445-46 (A.G. 1959). It was only recently, in fact, that
courts first allowed youth expungements to eliminate a marijuana convic-
tion for deportation purposes. See Mestre-Morera v. INS, 462 F.2d 1030
(1st Cir. 1972); In re Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. -, (I.D. 2276 1974); In re
Zingis, 14 I. & N. Dec. , (I.D. 2270 1974).
59. Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, 21 (N.D. IlM. 1975).
60. Id. at 13, 14, 19.
61. See id. at 20.
62. Deportation of aliens based on both marijuana and narcotics convic-
tions is prescribed by I. & N. Act § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (11)
(1970).
63. For examples of such statutes see CAL. HEzLTH & S. CoD. § 11357
(West Supp. 1974) (possession); id. § 11359 (possession for sale); id. § 11360(transporting, selling, or giving away); id. § 11365 (knowingly being in a
place where marijuana is used); id. § 11550 (use or being under the influ-
ence). On January 1, 1976, the new California law discussed in note 41
supra takes effect.
64. Under I. & N. Act § 105a, 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1970), an alien may appeal
an adverse Board of Immigration Appeals decision directly to the United
States Court of Appeals.
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CONCLUSION
Two important rules of law emerging from Lieggi are that de-
portation is punishment, and that deportation for a marijuana con-
viction can be cruel and unusual punishment.
When coupled with the accelerated pace of statutory reform re-
garding marijuana, 65 as well as with several recent Supreme
Court decisions expanding the constitutional rights of aliens in
other areas,66 the Lieggi decision hopefully will be applied liber-
ally. At the very least, Lieggi's value lies in its break with prev-
ious judicial refusal to treat deportation as a form of punishment.
Those judges whose sole reason for rejecting eighth amendment
arguments in a deportation context had been the absence of pre-
cedent may now be more comfortable in recognizing what has long
been common sense: the alien deported from the country in which
he resides has been punished, and such punishment, at least with
respect to marijuana convictions, can be cruel and unusual. The
Lieggi decision is welcome and long overdue.
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY
FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO AN INTER-
NAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7602 SUMMONS:
United States v. Sun First National Bank of Orlando,
510 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Sun: THE DECISION BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
In 1973, the Internal Revenue Service undertook an investiga-
tion of the consolidated income tax return of the First at Orlando,
65. See note 41 supra.
66. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state bar cannot exclude aliens);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (state cannot exclude aliens from
civil service employment); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(state cannot exclude aliens from welfare benefits).
